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Abstract—Cloud computing has completely changed our lives.
This technology dramatically impacted on how we play, work
and live. It has been widely adopted in many sectors mainly
because it reduces the cost of performing tasks in a flexible,
scalable and reliable way.
To provide a secure cloud computing architecture, the highest
possible level of protection must be applied. Unfortunately,
the cloud computing paradigm introduces new scenarios where
security protection techniques are weakened or disabled to obtain
a better performance and resources exploitation. An important
case is the memory deduplication mechanism which is canceled
by the address space layout randomization (ASLR) protection
technique.
In this paper we present a precise analysis of the impact on the
memory deduplication technique when the kernel randomization
is enabled. We have classified the memory content unit (pages)
in four different types, identifying the pages that depend on the
Kernel ASLR that are canceling the memory savings.
Our experiments show that the memory overhead to run
24 kernels is increased by 534% when kernel randomization
is enabled. Finally, we propose and discuss three different
approaches including solutions that restores the memory
deduplication saving while keeping a reasonable security level.
Index Terms—Cloud, Memory Deduplication, Information
Security, KASLR, Memory Management, Virtualization
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing has become a significant aspect of our
lives. It allows a provider to share pools of configurable
resources (hardware/software) through virtualization, yielding
new complex business models that were unpredictable some
years ago. Cloud computing has been widely adopted in many
sectors, mainly because it reduces the cost of performing tasks
in a flexible, scalable and reliable way. From the user’s point of
view, they can benefit from vast computing power and storage
without the need to possess the necessary hardware resources.
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) [1] is considered one of
the fundamental building blocks for cloud services because at
this level, a client is able to configure virtualized environments
with high flexibility without having to concern about deploying
large rooms of physical computers. Thence the service
provider supplies the storage, networking and virtualization
so that the client has full control over the system from OS
layer upwards. Efficient resource management is fundamental
to deal with a proper cloud infrastructure. Hardware resources
are a critical asset in the business and it must be managed and
utilized adequately. A cloud service provider will obtain more
benefits if he/she is able to operate more virtual machines with
the same resources.
Given the significance that cloud computing has in people’s
lives, it is imperative to offer confidentiality, integrity, and
availability in any cloud computing architecture. Furthermore,
there is a stack of services relying on IaaS for example
Platform as a Service (PaaS), Software as a Service (SaaS)
or Function as a Service (FaaS) to name a few. Any security
issue affecting the base will affect the upper layers as well.
For that reason, IaaS service providers must ensure to reach
the highest possible level of security in order to guarantee a
suitable quality to their clients.
Since the finding of the first computer bug back in 1947 [2]
the sphere has been changing swiftly. Attackers are aware of
the fact that computers are the building blocks of our society.
For this reason, bugs with security implications are being
abused in order to make profit of those vulnerabilities. Given
the asymmetric nature of the confrontation between attackers
and defenders, the former enjoy their tactical advantage while
the latter design and develop defense mechanisms to prevent
the successful exploitation of the most complex attacks. In
recent years there has been a transition in the battlefield
from userland to kernel since the userland exploits complexity
has overtaken the kernel ones. Furthermore, a successful
exploitation of a kernel vulnerability is much more dainty for
an attacker.
Although cloud service providers desire to yield as much
security as possible in their infrastructure, it is not
always possible. Unfortunately, there is no perfect defense
mechanism that solves all the problems. Besides, some
security mechanisms can severely affect the efficiency of
other performance mechanisms. Kernel randomization is an
instance of this issue. When it is enabled along with memory
deduplication, the memory saving effectiveness is considerably
reduced. As a result, a cloud infrastructure running virtual
machines with their kernels being randomized will sustain a
forfeit of memory resources.
Throughout this paper we analyze the impact of kernel
randomization in cloud environments and how it is canceling
memory deduplication. The remainder of the paper is
organized as follows. Section II introduces two background
concepts: memory deduplication and kernel randomization.
In Section III the problem of memory deduplication being
canceled by kernel randomization is presented. In Section
IV, a page classification is proposed to properly identify the
problem, and in Section V the results of our experiments
are displayed. Finally, Section VI discusses some workable
solutions, and Section VII concludes. The main contributions
of this paper are the following:
• We have classified the memory contents unit (pages)
in four different types, identifying that only one
(ASLR-Dependant Mergeable Pages) is preventing
memory deduplication due to the kernel randomization.
• A detailed analysis of the Linux kernel memory
overhead introduced by the kernel randomization security
protection.
• Our experiments in a live cloud environment showed that
the memory footprint to run only the Linux kernels can
be increased by a factor of 6 just by enabling kernel
randomization.
• We proposed and discussed different approaches that
prevents memory deduplication cancellation due to the
kernel randomization including solutions that maximize
memory savings while keeping a reasonable security
level.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section we summarize first the memory deduplication
memory saving mechanism and later the Kernel Address Space
Layout Randomization protection technique.
A. Memory Deduplication
Memory deduplication is a memory saving mechanism that
consists in unifying identical pages in order to liberate the
space occupied by the redundant copies. Given the noteworthy
importance of efficient memory resources utilization on behalf
of cloud computing providers, deduplication is a significant
feature. It is able to reduce the memory footprint across virtual
machines [? ? ], decreasing the total cost of managing and
ownership.
Although in the first instance deduplication was designed to
be used in hypervisors [3? ? ? ], it was gently applied
for memory contents of non-virtualized environments as well.
Then, it was widely adopted by most of the operating systems.
For example the Linux kernel included Kernel Samepage
Merging in the version 2.6.32 [4] and Windows introduced
Memory Page Combining in Windows 8 [5]. In addition,
data deduplication is commonly used in other areas such as
databases or web contents [6? ? ].
Pages are compared in pairs. Usually, a hash of the page
contents is compared for efficiency reasons. However, at
least one bit-to-bit comparison must be performed before
merging two identical pages into one single copy in physical
memory. This job is typically carried out by a background
thread periodically. After a successful merge, both pages will
be mapped into a single physical page frame in memory
using Copy-On-Write (COW) semantics [7]. As a result,
the space occupied by the redundant copy can be released.
Subsequently, if another page with the same contents is
generated, it can be mapped into the same physical page
frame without the need of allocating a new one. In order
to accomplish this, it is needed to actively scan the entire
set of potentially shareable memory continuously, comparing
the contents and detecting redundancy. The scanning space
is formed by all those memory regions that are likely to be
merged. Depending on the implementation, it can be specific
subscribed memory regions (e.g. KSM [8]) or simply all the
system’s memory (e.g. Windows Memory Combining [9]).
In a virtualized environment, deduplication is commonly
applied to the entire memory region corresponding to the
virtual machine (often called guest physical memory). Hence,
all those pages belonging to that memory region will be
candidates for being shared. To the memory deduplication
mechanism, the memory content unit size is equal to the
pagesize that the host itself is operating. Modern architectures
and operating systems offer the possibility of using greater
pagesizes [10, 11? ] which can be profitable for certain
application-specific usages, for example in programs managing
large databases in memory. A greater pagesize implies less
page table entries and less TLB faults, resulting in higher
performance at the price of having the risk of memory wasting
caused by internal fragmentation. As an instance, Linux KVM
uses Transparent Huge Pages [12] in the region corresponding
to guest physical memory. In memory deduplication terms,
to increase the pagesize means that more bits have to be
compared in a single merge attempt and it will be more
probable to find a dissimilarity. On the other hand, there will be
less pages to compare, reducing the effort required to perform
the memory deduplication.
B. Kernel Randomization
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [13] is a
security technique that consists in placing the memory
regions of a program in random locations. The objective
of this technique is to hinder the successful exploitation of
vulnerabilities (e.g. through buffer overflow) which rely on
the knowledge of valid addresses such as code-reuse attacks.
As a consequence, an attacker must guess (or leak) addresses
where code or data is located in memory in order to trigger
a malicious payload. It is frequently used in combination
with Data Execution Prevention / No-Execute (DEP/NX) [?
] and the Stack Smashing Protector (SSP) [14] resulting in a
beneficial complementation [? ].
ASLR embraces some requirements in order to be applied
correctly. It needs a high-quality entropy source for generating
cryptographically secure random numbers and to determine
a given base address. If this requirement is not fulfilled,
the predictability of the generated addresses will be high
and then it will be easier for an attacker to guess correctly
a valid address. On the other hand, a userspace program
must be compiled as position-independent executable (PIE)
in order to get the maximum benefit of ASLR, otherwise the
memory regions corresponding to the executable file will not
be randomized.
Kernel ASLR (KASLR) or kernel randomization is the
applying of this technique to the kernel. Locations of kernel
memory regions are determined at boot time and they are not
changed until next shutdown/reboot. Each implementation has
its particularities, but code and data regions are commonly
randomized. It is currently being used by all the main
operating systems: Apple introduced it into MacOS X
Mountain Lion (Mac OS X 10.8) [? ], Microsoft introduced it
in Windows Vista and Linux in the kernel version 3.14 [15].
Given that it is not easy to dynamically change the kernel’s
random location once it’s running, any infoleak revealing a
kernel’s pointer could defeat completely KASLR given that
the virtual memory layout could be inferred. In addition,
kernel randomization may have some limitations in certain
hardware configurations [? ]. The entropy is also a down-side,
due to the fact that the computer may not have enough
randomness at boot time. On the other hand, Kernel ASLR
affords statistical defense as in userland ASLR and a wrong
guess will cause a shutdown of the entire system, in opposition
to a userland forking server target application. As noted
by Kees Cook [16], KASLR can be really useful in certain
environments, for example in sandboxed applications, since
they are not allowed to get the information needed to attack
KASLR.
III. MEMORY DEDUPLICATION CHALLENGES
Virtualization is a key element used by cloud infrastructure
providers, as it allows efficient use of physical resources.
Physical computers are virtually split into multiple virtual
machines, and each virtual machine is delimited to use a subset
of the host’s resources.
Memory deduplication is applied to pages in the same
physical host. This includes the sharing of pages belonging
to different virtual machines that are co-located in the same
host. The memory deduplication mechanism will be able
to merge any pair of pages if their contents are identical
bit-to-bit. An efficient approach to maximize memory sharing
by deduplication would be to arrange virtual machines
in physical hosts based on similarities in their memory
contents. Unfortunately, this is not a simple task, and the
effort might be higher than the gains [? ]. The challenge
appears when different virtual machines contain pages that
could be identical, but are different because of kernel
randomization. Given that their contents differ, those pages
are not deduplicated.
Consider the case where two virtual machines are co-located
in a same physical host, as in figure 1, where memory
deduplication is enabled. Each guest has two memory pages
(A and B), and the page A holds a pointer to the address of
page B. Initially, the page B is located at the same address
in both guests (figure 1a). Therefore, the pointers in A will
match between virtual machines independently of the location
of the page A, and the memory deduplication mechanism will
be able to merge both pages A. On the other hand, if the
page B of one of the guests is moved to a different address,
the respective pointer have to be updated to the new location
(figure 1b). As a consequence, the contents of the page A in
this virtual machine will differ with the other, breaking the
memory sharing by deduplication. In this case, the contents
of page B do not change with respect to the initial case unless
it contains any pointer to itself.
Kernel ASLR settles the kernel’s memory regions in random
locations. The kernel base address of two different virtual
machines will certainly differ if both kernels are randomized.
With it, pointers referencing to kernel parts will differ as well.
If this is so, the contents of the pages holding those pointers
vary and memory deduplication in the host machine is not able
to merge them. On the contrary, when the memory layout of
both virtual machines coincide, the guest pages that contains
pointers referencing to kernel locations are identical. In this
case, the contents does not differ and those pages can be
deduplicated.
Therefore, when kernel randomization is enabled in the
guests, the host suffers a decrement of memory sharing by
deduplication. As a consequence, more memory is needed
to run the virtual machines. Cloud infrastructure providers
are deprived of using that amount of lost memory to hold
more virtual machines, and therefore, more clients. In the next
sections we provide a method to measure the actual memory
overhead produced by the kernel randomization over memory
deduplication in a virtualized environment.
Although there are previous works analyzing the influence
of address randomization on memory deduplication [? ],
those are based on particular userland loads with a concrete
number of virtual machines where both userland and kernel
memories were measured. Unfortunately, this approach can
not be employed to measure the actual memory overhead
produced by the kernel randomization. Therefore, those results
are not valid to properly measure how kernel randomization
is canceling memory deduplication, which is necessary to
assess and encourage new Kernel ASLR designs that optimizes
memory sharing.
(a) Page A is identical between virtual machines,
and can be shared by deduplication.
(b) Pointers in pages A differ. Memory
deduplication cannot merge any page.
Figure 1: Breakage of memory deduplication by moving memory regions being referenced.
IV. PROPOSED PAGE CLASSIFICATION
To properly address the issue detailed in section III, it is
necessary to identify those pages that are preventing the
deduplication mechanism from sharing memory because of the
kernel randomization mechanism. In this section, we propose
a classification of pages that enables us to arrange them
according to their contents. It is important to consider this
classification in the context of memory deduplication between
different virtual machines because it allows us to delimit and
differentiate which pages are relevant to solve the problem.
A. Always Mergeable Pages
Always Mergeable Pages are pages with identical content that
are always shared by the memory deduplication mechanism.
The content of these pages could be different during their
lifetime but eventually they will end up being identical.
This is a normal behavior on some systems where pages are
typically used in uninitialised memory that are later initialized
with the same content. In cloud systems, it can occur that a
particular virtual machine is running ahead of another one in a
certain moment of time. Even if they are two instances of the
same image, there could be some Always Mergeable Pages not
being shared until both virtual machines achieve a stable state.
At that moment, all pages of this kind will be merged with
their respective homologous pages unconditionally. Always
Mergeable Pages are not affected by address randomization.
B. Never Mergeable Pages
Never Mergeable Pages are pages with different content that
are never shared by the memory deduplication mechanism.
The contents of these pages are inexorably unique and
therefore they cannot be merged with any other page.
In cloud systems, virtual machines may have pages with
unique contents. As an instance, two virtual machines that
are running the same kernel version but they have been
compiled at different moments will have different compilation
timestamps. Thus, the corresponding guest pages that holds
that information are unique for the memory deduplication
mechanism, and they will never be merged. Although there
could be Never Mergeable Pages with identical contents
at some point (e.g. at boot time), those pages will differ
unconditionally once the system is stable. Never Mergeable
Pages are not affected by address randomization. Furthermore,
as they will never be merged by the memory deduplication
mechanism, they entail an unprofitable waste of effort and
memory.
C. ASLR-Dependant Mergeable Pages
ASLR-Dependant Mergeable Pages are pages whose contents
depend exclusively on address randomization. When address
randomization is enabled, the contents of these pages are
different and when it is disabled, the contents are identical.
In cloud systems, if the memory layout of the virtual machines
differs between them, then ASLR-Dependant Mergeable Pages
act like Never Mergeable Pages. On the contrary, if the
memory layout of the virtual machines is equal, then
ASLR-Dependant Mergeable Pages act like Always Mergeable
Pages.
These pages are the culprits of the impact of address
randomization over memory deduplication. To wane this
impact, it is needed to maximize the ASLR-Dependant
Mergeable Pages that convert into Always Mergeable Pages
and minimize those that convert into Never Mergeable Pages.
D. Non-ASLR-Dependant Mergeable Pages
Non-ASLR-Dependant Mergeable Pages are pages whose
contents depend on external factors different than address
randomization. The contents of these pages are usually unique
but they might match at some point.
Acronym Classification Name
AMP Always Mergeable Pages
NMP Never Mergeable Pages
ADMP ASLR-Dependant Mergeable Pages
NADMP Non-ASLR-Dependant Mergeable Pages
Table I: Page classification abbreviations.
In cloud systems, virtual machines may have pages with
unpredictable contents. As an instance, the Linux global
variable called jiffies is a counter that stores the number of
ticks occurred since system start-up [? ]. Each virtual machine
has their own private counter, and the value of each one
depends on how many CPU cycles the host dedicates to them.
Although two virtual machines will rarely have the same value
at a specific moment because of the fine-granularity of these
counters, it could occur. Nevertheless, Non-ASLR-Dependant
Mergeable Pages will certainly differ.
V. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
In this section we present the analysis of memory overhead
produced by the Linux kernel randomization mechanism
on KSM. Our approach only measures ASLR-Dependant
Mergeable Pages between virtual machines to calculate the
memory overhead produced only by the kernel randomization.
We have compiled the Linux kernel v4.17, as it is the
last stable mainline version in kernel.org at the date of
writing this paper, with the default configuration for the
x86 64 architecture (x86_64_defconfig). Thereupon, the
experiment consists of running several virtual machines at
the same time, enabling and disabling kernel randomization
in order to see the differences of memory being saved
by KSM. As KASLR support is enabled by default in
the chosen configuration, we can disable/enable it with the
kernel cmdline, using the flags “nokaslr” and “kaslr”
respectively. KSM status information is gathered from
the sysfs files in /sys/kernel/mm/ksm/ [8]. The
experiments are performed on a machine with an Intel Xeon
W-2155 processor running at 3.30 GHz and 32 GiB of
SDRAM memory. The hypervisor used is KVM (Linux kernel
4.17.0-ARCH) along with the Qemu emulator version 2.12.0,
being managed by Virsh version 4.4.0.
Userspace activities can alter many kernel internal data
structures (existing processes, open files, etc) along with
other side effects (e.g. pagecache) that may alter the memory
contents of the guests, altering the measurements of memory
sharing in the host. Since the scope of this study is confined to
the kernel side, we have generated a dummy initrd image
of 411 bytes consisting of a single init program that simply
calls to nanosleep() within an infinite loop. This way we
have a minimal userland side in the experiment.
Linux KSM scans memory regions that have been previously
registered for that purpose. Therefore, a program needs to
mark all those regions whose contents are likely to be
shareable. It can be achieved by means of the madvise()
system call, using the MADV_MERGEABLE flag. All the pages
belonging to the specified region will be candidates to be
merged and processed by KSM. When Qemu launches a virtual
machine, it marks the whole region corresponding to the
guest physical memory as mergeable. It is important to take
into account that the total amount of memory processed by
KSM (i.e. potentially shareable memory) does not necessarily
correspond with the amount of memory reserved by the host.
For efficiency reasons, Linux does not generate a page until
it is accessed, so KSM will actually process only pages that
the virtual machine has consumed. The sharing effectiveness
of KSM can be obtained through some sysfs files [8] in
/sys/kernel/mm/ksm/. The file pages_shared shows
the number of merged pages (e.g. for two identical pages, one
is freed while the other is shared), the file pages_sharing
shows the number of redundant pages that have been saved
(i.e. saved memory), and the files pages_unshared and
pages_volatile shows the number of unique pages
and the number of pages that are continuously changing,
respectively. The sum of the four values yields the total amount
of potentially shareable memory.
Table II shows a summary of the statistics obtained in our
experiments. We have launched from 2 to 24 virtual machines
at the same time, enabling and disabling KASLR. Each virtual
machine has 8 GiB of RAM assigned. In all cases, the amount
of memory processed by KSM (which is the total amount
of potentially shareable memory) increases approximately a
3.5% when the guest kernels are being randomized. This total
amount of memory processed by KSM is divided into two
columns: the memory being saved by KSM and the memory
used by the virtual machines (i.e. the memory that KSM could
not merge). We can observe that enabling KASLR in the
guests introduces a memory overhead in both memory saved
and memory used values. The relative overhead of enabling
KASLR is shown in the third column. For example, when
the host is running 24 virtual machines at the same time,
randomizing the kernels introduces an increase in memory
used by 534.75% (from 613 MiB to 3891 MiB), and memory
deduplication is saving 49.37% less memory.
Figure 2 represents the rate of memory saved in reference
to the total memory processed by KSM. With only 2 virtual
machines, KSM is able to save a 64.5% when kernel
randomization is disabled and a 41.7% when enabled. The
difference (22.7% of penalty) increases until a certain point
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Figure 2: Rate of memory saved by KSM in the host.
Num. VMs Memory Processed by KSM (MiB) Memory Saved by KSM (MiB) Memory Used by VMs (MiB)
KASLR Off KASLR On Overhead KASLR Off KASLR On Overhead KASLR Off KASLR On Overhead
2 564 584 +3.55% 364 243 -33.24% 200 340 +70.00%
4 1128 1167 +3.46% 888 504 -43.24% 240 663 +176.25%
8 2256 2336 +3.55% 1934 1025 -47.00% 321 1310 +308.10%
16 4513 4673 +3.55% 4046 2069 -48.86% 466 2603 +458.58%
24 6769 7008 +3.53% 6156 3117 -49.37% 613 3891 +534.75%
Table II: Statistics of our experiments, showing the results for 2, 4, 8, 16 and 24 virtual machines running in the host. The
data of the first column (Memory Processed by KSM) is the total of the sum of the other two columns: Memory Saved by
KSM and Memory Used by the virtual machines.
(approx. 16 virtual machines). From there, the difference of
the memory savings rate by deduplication will be similar,
regardless of the number of virtual machines running in the
host. With 24 virtual machines, KSM is saving a 90.9% of
memory if the kernels are not randomized, in opposition to a
44.4% if kernel randomization is enabled.
From these results we can separate and quantify the amount
of ASLR-Dependant Mergeable Pages. All the pages whose
contents do not depend on address randomization can be
discarded. The quantity of pages that are always identical
(AMP) and those that are different (NMP and NADMP) does
not vary between the two cases of enabling and disabling
kernel randomization. On the other hand, the pages whose
contents depends on address randomization act like NMP or
like AMP when kernel randomization is enabled or disabled,
respectively. Thus, the total amount of ADMP pages can be
obtained by subtracting the amount of memory saved when
kernel randomization is enabled (total of AMP) to the amount
of memory saved when kernel randomization is disabled. In
our experiments, when the host is running 24 virtual machines,
the 44.89% of the pages are ADMP.
The ASLR-Dependant Mergeable Pages cannot be shared by
deduplication when kernel randomization is enabled in the
guests, because the contents differ between virtual machines.
As a consequence, the memory needed to run the virtual
machines is severely increased. In our experiments, the
memory saving rate decreases almost a 50% compared with
the case where kernel randomization is disabled. To obtain
higher sharing rates it is needed to adjust the ADMP pages.
VI. SOLUTIONS DISCUSSION
The kernel randomization security protection has an important
impact in memory savings, which could be unacceptable for
some cloud infrastructure providers. Following we discuss
three solutions that can mitigate and prevent the kernel
randomization from canceling the memory deduplication
saving mechanism.
The solutions presented in this section can allow cloud
infrastructure providers to obtain significant additional gains
in memory terms, increasing the efficient use of memory
resources, which would imply more clients and thus more
benefits.
Figure 3: Memory regions placed in the default address.
A. Disable Kernel Randomization
Disabling kernel randomization in the guests is a quick
and an easy-to-implement workaround, but it is not a
solution by itself. Without kernel randomization, the guest
kernels are deterministically placed in a default address. As
a consequence, ADMP are converted into AMP, and the
memory deduplication mechanism is able to merge them,
eliminating the sharing problem and increasing the memory
savings in the host machine. This approach can be a suitable
method in certain environments, for example private clouds
properly secured for external attacks. Nevertheless, we do not
recommend disabling any security mechanism.
Figure 3 shows a sketch of this approach, with two virtual
machines running in the same host. In this example, memory
region A is identical between both virtual machines, and the
same occurs with the region B. Although only a few pages
are represented for sake of simplicity, the entire regions A
and B are deduplicated. In addition, some pages with identical
contents across region A and region B will be shared as well,
resulting in higher memory savings.
B. Match the Same Random Memory Layout Between Guests
This solution is an extension of disabling kernel
randomization. If virtual machines located in a certain
host have the same memory layout, the memory deduplication
mechanism will be able to obtain a similar sharing rate than
when kernel randomization is disabled. The chosen memory
layout is randomized as in regular kernel randomization but
then, this layout configuration is shared between other guests.
As a consequence, subsequent virtual machines will place their
memory regions at the same location as the previously loaded
guests. Thus, the guest kernels are practically randomized
from the point of view of an external attacker. This solution
combines the deduplication effectiveness of disabling kernel
randomization and the statistical defense provided by kernel
randomization to the outside. Unfortunately this approach
weakens defenses against co-located virtual machines.
Figure 4 shows two virtual machines holding two memory
regions (A and B). Both virtual machines have the same
memory layout. Memory regions A and B are placed in
random locations, but these locations are the same in both
guests. In this example, the memory deduplication sharing rate
is equal to the case when kernel randomization is disabled,
given that the contents of the regions are identical across
virtual machines.
C. Sub-page Level Memory Deduplication
In some cases deduplication is canceled by a difference in a
single bit or a single word (e.g. a pointer). If this is so, a
whole page stops being a candidate for being shared because
the entire contents do not match with any other page. As an
instance, a page of 4 KiB with an unpredictable word of 8
bytes is being deprived of sharing the other 4088 bytes, if
the minimum memory content unit is a whole page of 4 KiB.
For this reason, applying memory deduplication in a sub-page
level could increase sharing opportunities [? ]. The drawback
of this approach is that it may incur performance overhead.
Figure 5 illustrates this idea, with two virtual machines holding
two memory regions (A and B), each region in a random
location. Every memory region is different than the others,
but some words are identical. In this example, given that
there is no equal pair of pages, the memory sharing rate
by deduplication in a regular mechanism with a minimum
memory content unit of one page would be zero. With this
approach, all the identical words can be shared, thus increasing
the profit of memory resources.
Figure 4: Co-located virtual machines with the same memory
layout.
Figure 5: Sub-page level memory deduplication.
VII. CONCLUSION
Cloud computing relies on multiple technologies to provide
cost effective solutions. We discussed that despite the effort
and work that is being done in cloud computing technologies
there are still challenging problems to combine them with
security solutions.
In this paper we analyzed the memory deduplication optimizer
present in all modern hypervisors and how it is canceled
by the kernel randomization protection mechanism. We have
classified the memory content unit (pages) in four different
types which enabled us to precisely identify the root of the
problem. Our experiments showed that 3278 MiB of additional
memory (+534.75%) are used by the host to run 24 kernel
guests.
Finally, we have proposed and discussed three different
approaches including solutions that restores the memory
deduplication saving while keeping a reasonable security level.
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